The Foreseeable Future: 10 Geopolitical Predictions for 2010

Failed Prediction	10 Geopolitical Predictions for 2010 - Confirmation Date Sat, 01 Jan 2011
oilprice.com Member	From http://www.oilprice.com/articles-geopolitics.php (edited excerpt from The Free Daily Intelligence Newsletter) In a report on March 20, 2009, I noted: “the ‘professional politician’ will morph into new forms of Cæsarism or Bonapartism... ‘leaders’ with no practical experience of the world increasingly fear the uncertainties of markets and the confidence of those who can actually create, manage, and build. The new circus includes the pandering to newly-created pseudo-scientific religions, such as “climate change.” 1. The decline in Western asset values will likely continue in the broad sense through 2010, which will automatically lead to a compounded reduction in the asset-based credit available. In other words, Western economies will be forcibly “de-levered”; 2. The West will demonstrably not contest dominance of the major oil and gas fields of Iraq, Iran, Nigeria (and elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea) against competition from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, to a lesser extent, India. This will force moves in the US toward natural gas exploitation and — as Obama and the “green left” depart — possible exploitation of US oilfields and new nuclear energy approaches. This would in turn imply a renewed look at nuclear waste disposal. But none of this Western search for alternatives will occur in 2010. 3. The conflict in Afghanistan will become increasingly strained as the US sends out, literally, signals of surrender to the Taliban, who take all calls from the US for a “negotiated settlement” in the wake of a pronouncement of US imminent withdrawal as a sign of weakness and defeat. 4. India will of necessity have to re-align with Russia if it is to gain any access to the Eurasian heartland. If it does not, it will never be able to compete strategically in the near future with the PRC, which is pushing ahead with the construction of more efficient overland links to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and through Pakistan. 5. A strategic opportunity is emerging for the West — and possibly for India — in the transformation now occurring in Myanmar as the ruling military leaders take very seriously their approach to elections later in 2010. This could — could, not necessarily will — mean that Myanmar opens to a more Western orientation to the detriment of the PRC, but only if the US can support the notion of providing some measure of post-election security, ideally within Myanmar, for the retiring military leaders. 6. As global productivity fades during 2010 (albeit with some pockets of resilience), many Western leaders will turn to sophistry and intellectual distractions, such as an attempt to assert or blame “international law” as the mechanism for remedying their situations. There is, in reality, no such thing as “international law”, but there is an attempt to create it, even absent global acceptance of such a concept. There are norms of international behavior, but, strictly speaking, the United Nations (around which much of the proposed “international law” is being built) specifies the right of nations and peoples to self-determination, free from external interference. But what we are seeing is the creation of a minority-controlled set of structures — such as the “International Criminal Court” and its derivatives — creating laws without any valid legal framework. The ICC derivative judging “war crimes” in the former Yugoslavia, for example, has been making up laws and case law to validate its position. In any event, 2010 will see a stark removal of the media-perpetuated view that “international law” exists... This, as I have often said, is part of the trend which sees nations moving back toward nationalistic stances and protectionism. “International law”, and the United Nations itself, is heading toward irrelevancy. The feel-good gatherings, such as the World Economic Forum, at Davos, Switzerland and even the Copenhagen conference on “climate change”, become mere distractions from the real issues facing the world. 7. The unease and conflict in the Arabian Peninsula will continue apace, with strong Iranian support and some Russian interest, merely because there is nothing to stop it. Only a total compromise of Yemen Pres. ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh to Iran — something which would greatly antagonize Saudi Arabia — can bring the fighting in the area to a more contained level, and even that would signify an Iranian victory. 8. It is in a climate of profound international distrust in any Western support or ability to protect that we will see the transition of power occurring in places such as Egypt and Nigeria in 2010. Both states are critical to the West, both geopolitically and in energy terms. France has offered a strong degree of support for a stable Egyptian transition, but the rest of the West has been fairly impotent. Similarly, Pakistan is undergoing a constitutional crisis which may see Pres. Asif Ali Zardari removed by the Supreme Court which he, essentially, helped reinstate after the end of the Musharraf Administration. Even if Pres. Zardari can circumvent the mounting constitutional legal case being mounted against him, his powers are being eroded by the National Assembly. 9. It is profoundly unlikely that Israel will militarily attack Iran in 2010, or in the foreseeable future. As a result, the clerical leadership in Iran will move inexorably toward greater consolidation, a process which will occur in diametric contrast to the rising shrillness of US condemnation of Iran’s nuclear position. The reality is that (a) international embargoes against Iran have already failed, and new embargoes cannot be implemented as long as Russia and the PRC guarantee Iranian trade, (b) the US (and Israel) cannot militarily attack Iran with any hope of a positive strategic outcome because the nuclear and National Command Authority targets are too diffuse and there is no capability of a ground-force follow-up, and (c) the Iranian population would, as they have always done, react with great hostility to any foreign attack, rallying around the government of the day, even if they have despised it... Still, mounting internal frustration in Iran could result in a coup by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC: Pasdaran). 10. The People’s Republic of China will continue to manage the great internal disparities through 2010, but there is no guarantee that Beijing will not face major hurdles in the year. Moreover, the continuing poor economic performance in Japan and the US will continue to constrain PRC exports and dampen PRC economic options given the extent of Chinese holdings of US securities which grow less attractive by the day.
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From http://www.oilprice.com/articles-geopolitics.php

(edited excerpt from The Free Daily Intelligence Newsletter)

In a report on March 20, 2009, I noted: “the ‘professional politician’ will morph into new forms of Cæsarism or Bonapartism... ‘leaders’ with no practical experience of the world increasingly fear the uncertainties of markets and the confidence of those who can actually create, manage, and build.

The new circus includes the pandering to newly-created pseudo-scientific religions, such as “climate change.”

1. The decline in Western asset values will likely continue in the broad sense through 2010, which will automatically lead to a compounded reduction in the asset-based credit available. In other words, Western economies will be forcibly “de-levered”;

2. The West will demonstrably not contest dominance of the major oil and gas fields of Iraq, Iran, Nigeria (and elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea) against competition from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, to a lesser extent, India. This will force moves in the US toward natural gas exploitation and — as Obama and the “green left” depart — possible exploitation of US oilfields and new nuclear energy approaches. This would in turn imply a renewed look at nuclear waste disposal. But none of this Western search for alternatives will occur in 2010.

3. The conflict in Afghanistan will become increasingly strained as the US sends out, literally, signals of surrender to the Taliban, who take all calls from the US for a “negotiated settlement” in the wake of a pronouncement of US imminent withdrawal as a sign of weakness and defeat.

4. India will of necessity have to re-align with Russia if it is to gain any access to the Eurasian heartland. If it does not, it will never be able to compete strategically in the near future with the PRC, which is pushing ahead with the construction of more efficient overland links to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and through Pakistan.

5. A strategic opportunity is emerging for the West — and possibly for India — in the transformation now occurring in Myanmar as the ruling military leaders take very seriously their approach to elections later in 2010. This could — could, not necessarily will — mean that Myanmar opens to a more Western orientation to the detriment of the PRC, but only if the US can support the notion of providing some measure of post-election security, ideally within Myanmar, for the retiring military leaders.

6. As global productivity fades during 2010 (albeit with some pockets of resilience), many Western leaders will turn to sophistry and intellectual distractions, such as an attempt to assert or blame “international law” as the mechanism for remedying their situations. There is, in reality, no such thing as “international law”, but there is an attempt to create it, even absent global acceptance of such a concept. There are norms of international behavior, but, strictly speaking, the United Nations (around which much of the proposed “international law” is being built) specifies the right of nations and peoples to self-determination, free from external interference. But what we are seeing is the creation of a minority-controlled set of structures — such as the “International Criminal Court” and its derivatives — creating laws without any valid legal framework. The ICC derivative judging “war crimes” in the former Yugoslavia, for example, has been making up laws and case law to validate its position. In any event, 2010 will see a stark removal of the media-perpetuated view that “international law” exists... This, as I have often said, is part of the trend which sees nations moving back toward nationalistic stances and protectionism. “International law”, and the United Nations itself, is heading toward irrelevancy. The feel-good gatherings, such as the World Economic Forum, at Davos, Switzerland and even the Copenhagen conference on “climate change”, become mere distractions from the real issues facing the world.

7. The unease and conflict in the Arabian Peninsula will continue apace, with strong Iranian support and some Russian interest, merely because there is nothing to stop it. Only a total compromise of Yemen Pres. ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh to Iran — something which would greatly antagonize Saudi Arabia — can bring the fighting in the area to a more contained level, and even that would signify an Iranian victory.

8. It is in a climate of profound international distrust in any Western support or ability to protect that we will see the transition of power occurring in places such as Egypt and Nigeria in 2010. Both states are critical to the West, both geopolitically and in energy terms. France has offered a strong degree of support for a stable Egyptian transition, but the rest of the West has been fairly impotent. Similarly, Pakistan is undergoing a constitutional crisis which may see Pres. Asif Ali Zardari removed by the Supreme Court which he, essentially, helped reinstate after the end of the Musharraf Administration. Even if Pres. Zardari can circumvent the mounting constitutional legal case being mounted against him, his powers are being eroded by the National Assembly.

9. It is profoundly unlikely that Israel will militarily attack Iran in 2010, or in the foreseeable future. As a result, the clerical leadership in Iran will move inexorably toward greater consolidation, a process which will occur in diametric contrast to the rising shrillness of US condemnation of Iran’s nuclear position. The reality is that (a) international embargoes against Iran have already failed, and new embargoes cannot be implemented as long as Russia and the PRC guarantee Iranian trade, (b) the US (and Israel) cannot militarily attack Iran with any hope of a positive strategic outcome because the nuclear and National Command Authority targets are too diffuse and there is no capability of a ground-force follow-up, and (c) the Iranian population would, as they have always done, react with great hostility to any foreign attack, rallying around the government of the day, even if they have despised it... Still, mounting internal frustration in Iran could result in a coup by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC: Pasdaran).

10. The People’s Republic of China will continue to manage the great internal disparities through 2010, but there is no guarantee that Beijing will not face major hurdles in the year. Moreover, the continuing poor economic performance in Japan and the US will continue to constrain PRC exports and dampen PRC economic options given the extent of Chinese holdings of US securities which grow less attractive by the day.